Methodology

    How this database is built

    Critical-Minerals.si combines official government lists, the US Geological Survey's production and reserves data, and recent market reporting into one normalized database. Data as of October 8, 2026.

    Production, reserves and US reliance

    Country production (2024 actual, 2025 estimated), reserves, US net import reliance, import sources and end uses come from the USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (data release). Shares are calculated against the USGS world total for 2025 on the basis USGS reports (mine production unless noted — e.g. refinery output for gallium, germanium and indium, smelter output for aluminum). Where USGS withholds a country's figure, it is shown as withheld and excluded from shares.

    Individual rare-earth elements share group-level rare-earth oxide production totals, and platinum-group metal reserves are reported combined, because USGS does not publish element-level country figures. Some materials on national lists (e.g. electrical steel, metallurgical coal, helium) have partial or no country breakdown.

    National lists

    Each list was taken from the publishing government or an authoritative summary, then mapped to a single mineral vocabulary. Group entries (rare earths, PGMs) are marked “group” for each member element.

    Supply status

    An editorial assessment based on the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 and current reporting, reviewed for each mineral:

    Deficit Demand projected to outrun supply for years
    Tight Price spikes, export controls or active disruption
    Watch Adequate today but concentrated or exposed
    Adequate Diversified, well-supplied market

    AI relevance

    0 · MinimalNo meaningful direct role in AI infrastructure
    1 · SupportingIndirect or minor role (structures, alloys, niche parts)
    2 · ImportantPower, storage, cooling or key components
    3 · EssentialDirectly inside chips, optics, servers or the grid buildout

    Supply risk index (0–100)

    risk = 100 × ( 0.25 · top-producer share
      + 0.20 · China share
      + 0.15 · US net import reliance
      + 0.20 · export controls (China = 1, other = 0.6)
      + 0.20 · status weight (deficit 1 · tight 0.85 · watch 0.4 · adequate 0.1) )

    It is a transparent screening heuristic for comparison, not a forecast. Missing inputs count as zero, which can understate risk for minerals with withheld data.

    Supply chain by step and the processing gap

    Each mineral page splits supply into four steps: mine → separation / refining → metal / material → finished product. Labels are adapted to each mineral; for rare earths the steps are mining, separation, metal and alloy, and magnets. A step is marked “not applicable” where it does not exist (gallium has no mines of its own) and “not tracked yet” where no reusable public source gives country shares. We never fill a missing step with zero.

    Shares at the mining step reuse the USGS figures above. Later steps come from USGS refinery, smelter and metal series where they exist, and otherwise from figures stated in the text of IEA reports, which are licensed CC BY 4.0. We do not use the IEA's data explorers or data annexes, which are excluded from that licence, or paid price-reporting services. Every step shows its year and one of three confidence labels:

    • Official statisticsComputed from USGS country data
    • Published analysisStated in an IEA report
    • Industry estimateReported by an industry or expert group
    processing gap = China's share at the most concentrated later step
      − China's share at the mining step (percentage points)

    The gap is a separate measure and does not change the supply risk index or the scarcity scores on the Invest pages. It is shown only where both shares exist. Uranium is measured by the combined share of the top three countries, because the IEA reports its fuel cycle that way. Steps can mix years (most are 2025; rare earth magnets and polysilicon are 2024), so treat small differences with caution.

    Shares are by location, not ownership. Chinese companies own a large part of mining and refining capacity elsewhere, for example in the DR Congo, Indonesia and Africa's new lithium mines, so country shares can understate how much supply China controls.

    Key market sources

    This site is for research and education and is not investment advice.